

2: Demography

Demography is used here to mean the study of the most basic aspects of society other than population distribution. This includes things people cannot change such as their birthplace, sex, age, ethnic group — and some closely related phenomena which they can and do alter — their marital status, nationality, language and location. Illness and mortality are usually studied under the heading of demography, but so much information is available about these subjects that a separate chapter is reserved for health issues.

Basic demographic patterns underlie many of the more topical economic, social and political subjects covered later and they are included here to show the underlying distributions of people upon which economic circumstances, social choices and political movements prey. It is the changes in these basic patterns which most affect other distributions. An ageing population in one area or a high birth rate in another will increase the “dependency ratio” as easily as a fall in employment rates.

As many of the statistics in this chapter concern aspects which change only over generations, whenever a map of change is shown the twenty year perspective from 1971 is used if suitable figures are available. In graphing national changes, figures back to the last century are included where these are available. Demographic statistics rely more heavily on censuses than any other subject so almost all the information shown here is derived from the 1971, 1981 or 1991 censuses of population.

The chapter begins in life-cycle order with birth and fertility statistics. Next the simple ratios of women to men are shown, given the close connection of the ratio of the sexes to the age distribution — women being closely related to the very young and more likely to be (or to be caring for) the very old. The very different spatial distributions of two age groups of children are then examined. The geography of toddlers is shown just before they are old enough to go to nursery school or playgroup. This distribution is contrasted with that of adolescents who have just finished compulsory schooling. Keeping on the theme of education, the location of students and how that has changed over the last two decades is presented. The propensity of all young adults to marry or bring up children on their own is then depicted, followed by the changing geographical distribution of the likelihood of marriage for adults aged over 25. The section on age distribution is drawn to a close by showing the changing locational preferences of, or constraints on, pensioners in Britain.

The 1991 census was the first British census to ask people explicitly which ethnic group they thought they belonged to. Unfortunately, “white” ethnic groups were not differentiated, so 95% of the population fall into this bland group. The distributions of those people completing the “non-white” answers can be shown, both on map and

cartogram for each of the particular categories in which they felt themselves to be. For the bulk of the population, the nearest measure of their ethnic make-up is country of birth, so the locations of the English, Irish, Scots and Welsh *nations*, defined in this way, are plotted. Statistics on birthplace were collected in almost all censuses and so the changing locations over time for people from many other countries are also shown.

These changes in the distribution of people by birthplace and ethnic group occur almost exclusively because of population movement, hence the simple net patterns of migration are shown next, both within Britain and from abroad. One of the most interesting maps to plot would be emigration rates by area but it is not possible to find out how many people have left the country from each place. Changes in the patterns of lifetime migration to Britain can be shown over twenty years, by each group of migrants' present location in this country.


Finally, the distributions of the languages people speak are given in detail for Scottish Gaelic and Welsh speakers on maps which just show Scotland and Wales. Limitations on the questions which are asked in the census mean that the locations of other people who can speak languages other than English are not known. However, these two peripheral groups provide interesting patterns, particularly of the changes which have occurred in a generation, and also illustrate just how diverse are the group of people, here referred to with the apparently unambiguous phrase “British residents”.

Among the key results it is shown that in some cities almost twice as many children are born for every woman living there as in others. More children are born per woman where there are fewer than average young men. Most toddlers are growing up in cities, but a disproportionate number of school leavers live in the countryside (to which many of their parents have presumably migrated). At the age of 18 a large proportion of people are suddenly concentrated in the centre of cities again, but now as students, living in the middle of areas where people of their ages tend not to marry. In the cities the proportion of young lone parents is many times higher than in the more rural areas. It is in rural areas that the highest proportions of married people are found. Marriage is going out of fashion fastest in metropolitan areas, particularly in London. By the time people become pensioners many have moved even further from the cities in which most were born. But people in ethnic minority groups live almost exclusively in cities, as do people born in Ireland, despite belonging to a rapidly ageing population. Geographically, however, the most peripheral groups in Britain are those who speak Welsh or Scottish Gaelic.

In the chapters that follow, as the maps of unemployment rates, household overcrowding, ill health, poverty, wealth and votes are shown, the diagrams presented here should be referred back to. Remember that certain social circumstances, if geographically unevenly spread, are not distributed among a uniform society, but are highly concentrated within certain communities and are almost unheard of in others.


2.1: Fertility Ratios in England and Wales 1838–1991

relative number of births per year



2.2: Outcome of Conceptions in England and Wales 1969–1991

total conceptions other than miscarriages and stillbirths ('000s)



Fertility

Fertility measures the propensity of an adult to have children. Although it would be interesting to know how many children each man in Britain thinks he is the father of, statistics have only been collected nationally for women. Annual statistics on births have been collected for over one hundred and fifty years as Figure 2.1 shows. This figure depicts the ratio of births to various groups of women, not the fertility rate (which is how many children each woman tends to have). The high point over this period was an average of one birth every six years per woman (aged 15–44) in 1876; the low points were one every 17 years in both 1941 and 1977 (OPCS 1987). The baby boom of the 1960s and the smaller boom twenty years before that are clear, as is the recent increase in births outside marriage (rising to above 30% of all births in 1991). Another dramatic change has been in the decline of stillbirths. One in twenty five babies was born dead in the 1930s; today that figure is less than one in two hundred.


It is interesting to see where the twenty-somethings of today were most likely to have been born, and as the number of children each woman had ever had was last asked in the 1971 census, that year is chosen for the distribution shown opposite. Women in southern and some Scottish cities tended to have had the least children, while the rate was generally over average in northern cities (this has been the case at least since 1850 when the ethnicity factor of a “Danish influence” was cited as one possible explanation by the census authorities of those times! Population Trends 1977: 27). Fertility is lower, measured in this way, where there are disproportionately more younger women. A more independent standardised fertility ratio which allows for age structure could have been used but the interpretation would not have been so simple.

Today it is possible to calculate only a crude fertility ratio of the number of children to women by age. This is illustrated in the right-hand map opposite, showing changes in the spatial pattern of fertility between 1971 and 1991. Fertility has fallen everywhere except for central London and a few other distinctive clusters of wards, which together contain only 6% of the British population. The fall has been led by areas in between cities.

Figure 2.2 shows that between 1971 and 1991 the total number of conceptions rose from 836 000 to 854 000 per year. This is a fall when divided by the number of women aged 15 to 44, which increased by 15% over that period. The increase in legal abortions only accounts for a small part of the fall in fertility. Women are now becoming pregnant less frequently than their mothers. Of those who are having babies, more are choosing to do so outside marriage, but this rise is due mainly to an increase in the number of registrations by two unmarried parents. There has also been a marked decrease in the number of women getting married within eight months of conception and an increase in the number of children being born to a woman in her second or subsequent marriage. By 1991 only 56% of recorded conceptions were within marriage.


Fertility Rate 1971

children ever born to women in ward




Fertility Ratio 1971-1991


change in children per woman by ward



2.3: Single Year Sex Ratio in 1991 (showing change from 1981)



2.4: Age-Sex Distribution in 1991 (showing change from 1981)



Sex

The imbalance of the sexes is another basic geographical distribution. Any other aspect of society in which men are more or less likely to be engaged than women will partly reflect this distribution. It is interesting that in London, where the fertility rate of women is lowest, there are least men. However, one reason fewer men appear to be in the capital is that more men than women avoided census enumeration, particularly young men living in cities (see Figure 1.10 and the map on page 217).

Nationally, slightly more men than women are born (5% more in 1991), but by the age of 40 the ratios are even as men are more likely to die young than women. Figure 2.3 shows how, from then on, the ratio of women to men rises, there being two women for every man aged 82. The ratio has been decreasing for men aged between 20 and 30 (there has been greater male net immigration than deaths in recent years) but increasing for men aged between 30 and 50. Beyond age 50, due to improvements in men's health, the ratio has been falling over time (OPCS 1983, 1993, GRO(S) 1983, 1993).


The national distribution of men in the population (first map) shows concentrations of over 50% around the Home Counties, in central Birmingham and in the Potteries and Coalfields. Women dominate in London, Liverpool, Scottish cities and on the coast (where they tend to be either elderly or caring for the elderly). When the “young adult” age group is considered in isolation (far right), many of these patterns become clearer although here, it must be remembered, the effects of under-enumeration are most strong. The coast is now a much less clear cut entity, but the cities show even stronger divisions, being the only places likely to have more women enumerated in this age range.

In the graphs that accompany the maps in this atlas people are often disaggregated by their sex. This is done because there are often significant differences between the situations of men and women. Figure 2.4 shows the population pyramid of Britain shaded to indicate which parts are growing in size over time and which are declining. The baby boom generation (the birthplaces of the last of which are shown on the previous page) was, in 1991, in its late 20s. Below them the cohort in the first ten years of life is also rising and above them a peak can be seen of people who were born in 1947. The number of men aged 50 and 51 is increasing. The sudden drop in both sexes is for those few born before 1919, before which men tail away far faster than women, mostly because of natural causes, but also because so many men born before 1920 died in the Second World War. Premature deaths, like baby booms, influence the numbers in education, the size of the workforce and the numbers of pensioners for generations to come. The “spikes” at the top of the graph represent all people aged over 90.

The size of the baby boom generation today, the make-up of elderly people's households and the high numbers of people now approaching retirement age are all the result of specific differences in the life-chances and behaviour of men and women.


Male Residents 1991



proportion of ward populations



Young Men 1991

proportion of ward populations



2.5: Change in Single Year Sex Ratios 1981–1991**2.6: Change in the Size of Age Bands 1981–1991**

Children

Children present a great diversity of geographical patterns because adults are at their most mobile when their children are growing up. It would therefore make little sense to map children as a whole. Instead two narrow age ranges are concentrated on here: those aged 1 or 2 and those aged 16 or 17, both in 1991. The former have been termed “toddlers” here and show where the families of very young children live in disproportionate numbers. There tends to be significantly more toddlers growing up in East London and towards the centres of many large cities. In more rural areas, Inner London and on the coast, families tend to have fewer small children. These are also often the areas where young men are unlikely to be found (or enumerated). The close correspondence between this distribution and that of fertility rates twenty years earlier (page 27) shows, with some exceptions, how the same places are reserved for bringing up children over generations.


The same shading categories have been used to plot the cohort which has just passed through eleven years of schooling and usually one or more home moves. This group is 8% smaller in size than the toddlers and so very few areas have over 3.5% of their populations in this age band. The rings around Glasgow and London are particularly distinctive, however. Adolescents are least likely to be living where they are most often portrayed — in inner cities. Again this could be partly due to under-enumeration, but this age range is not thought to have been missed in high numbers (Figure 1.10). What this distribution represents is the movement of parents out into the suburbs and the countryside as their children grow up. It may also show where the few boarding schools and remand centres containing children of this age tend to be located.

There have been no great national changes in the proportion of children by sex over the 1980s as Figure 2.5 shows. The figures shown here are based on the mid-year estimates to avoid problems of under-enumeration (OPCS 1983, 1993). During the last decade men were more likely to have migrated to Britain in their 20s than women, but were also more likely to have emigrated or returned abroad in their 30s and 40s. Improvements in men's health over the age of 50 has increased the age–sex ratio rapidly. The dip by age 70 is due to these improvements not being so significant for men who were in their 20s during the last world war. Between 1981 and 1991 the proportion of the population aged 20 who were men rose by 2%.

The dramatic swings in the sizes of various age bands over just ten years is illustrated in Figure 2.6. These swings have repercussions for school class sizes, social security payments, the job and housing markets, future pension arrangements and so on. In 1991 school-leavers were having to compete with a much smaller number of people to find work than in 1981. When today's toddlers leave school there will be many thousands more people looking for work and homes.


Toddlers 1991

proportion of ward populations




School Leavers 1991


proportion of ward populations



2.7: Proportion of the Population Who Were Students by Age and Sex 1991



2.8: Proportion of Students in Each Ethnic Minority Group by Sex in Britain 1991



Students


Students are generally defined as anyone aged 16 or over who was at school or in full time education at the time of the census. A more familiar sub-group of students is used in the first map opposite, which shows the distribution of students aged 18 or over at their “term-time address”. This definition clearly picks out the country's universities and the local neighbourhoods in which their students tend to live (students living in halls are also included here). London dominates the country having by far the largest number of students. On the map Edinburgh and Manchester appear to vie for second place. The bright red wards constitute the “student lands” of Britain. Only one in twenty people live there, but one in twenty of them go to college.

Nationally almost two million people said they were students of some description in 1991, a rise of 11% on the total of twenty years ago. That increase has been concentrated in certain areas. In particular, it is inner cities which have seen the proportion of their student populations rise fastest. This would be partly due to residents who were not students leaving. The decline of boarding school populations around London and in the Scottish cities is also apparent (as Figure 1.12 indicated). When reading this map it is worth remembering that term times differed in different places over twenty years, that the population base is slightly different and that many students were not enumerated.


Nevertheless, the rise in numbers shows clear local clustering around specific universities. For example, the wards of the west end of Newcastle saw an extra 2% or more of their population become students over the two decades so that now more than 5% of that population is in full time education. Increasing rates of school-leavers “staying on” are one reason for the general rise. As Figure 2.7 shows, 78% of girls aged 16 and 73% of boys aged 16 were in full time education in 1991; by the age of 18 these two figures are 37% and 32%, respectively (more women now go on to take degrees or diplomas), but by the age of 20 these proportions are 18% and 19%, respectively. The current increase in student numbers can be seen working its way through the system in the census year through this changing balance of the sexes. Although there are now more mature students than before, a log scale is still needed to show them on the graph. Between the ages of 30 and 50 more students are women; aged over 50 they are more likely to be men. The figure also shows the variation in the number of students “working their way” through college. At age 16 one in nine girls and one in twelve boys are working as well as studying; by the age of 18 these figures are one in five and one in six, respectively.

Finally, the ethnic group composition of all non-white students is shown in Figure 2.8. Because a larger proportion of people in ethnic minorities tend to be in the younger age ranges a disproportionate number are in full time education, but this varies considerably among the groups and also by sex as the figure shows.


Students at College 1991 proportion of ward populations




Students 1971–1991 change in ward populations



2.9: Marital Status by Age in Britain 1991



2.10: Status of Young Adults in Britain 1991



Young Adults

In demographic terms the eight years of life from 16 to 24 are often the most turbulent. It is then that people will probably get a job, leave home and may get married. Figure 2.9 shows the likely marital status of individuals given their age and sex. Men are likely to remain single for slightly longer than women. Four out of every five people are married by their 50th birthday but less than one in three is married by the time they are 24. Spatially there are huge variations in the proportion of young people who have chosen to marry, as the map opposite highlights, with threefold variations between wards being commonplace. London and Liverpool have some of the lowest rates of marriage despite, or perhaps because of, also having few young men who are single. South Manchester, Bristol and Guildford also see very few young adults getting married.


Marriage is an important demographic influence on the population because of its association with having children. Lone parenthood is shown here as one alternative to married life for some young people, but the map of where young adults are lone parents is not the mirror image of where they choose to marry. In the ribbon that runs down the centre of London most young people are neither married nor lone parents. It is of course possible to be both married and a “lone parent” simultaneously as a *lone parent* is defined here, following the census, as an adult living on his/her own with child or children aged 0-15. Figure 2.10 shows how almost all young lone parents are women, but only 8% of all young women fall into this category by the age of 24 (this figure may well be inflated by young men excluding themselves from the census enumeration).

Young adults are most likely to be on a government scheme at the age of 17, and 17% of all men are unemployed at the age of 19 (although the proportion of those available to work, the unemployment rate, is 21%, with a further 3% being on government training schemes). Despite this, 79% of men and 67% of women are in work by the time they reach 24. This is very similar to the situation ten years ago, apart from a 10% increase in the proportion of 24 year old women in the workforce and a 2% rise in the proportion of 24 year old men not in work. The changes for all ages are shown in Figure 2.11, which cannot easily be summarised in the space available here. The dramatic changes in the sizes of these groups of people is due partly to the level of under-enumeration. Nevertheless, there are far fewer teenagers now than ten years ago. Despite this, 41% of 16 year old boys in 1991 who were available for work could not find it, compared to just 23% in 1981. The proportions of students who are women has risen fastest. Most dramatic are the falls in the number of people getting married at these ages. In 1981 a quarter of women aged 20 were married; a decade later that proportion had fallen to 9%. Choices over marriage affect decisions to have children and are affected by employment and educational opportunities. It is difficult to disassociate demographic changes from other changes that are happening in society.


2.11: The Changing Circumstances of Young Adults in Britain 1981–1991

Age	All Resident Persons		Married		Students		In the Workforce		Out of Work	
	1991	1981-91	1991	1981-91	1991	1981-91	1991	1981-91	1991	1981-91
Male	'000s	%change	% of all	change%	% of all	change%	% of all	change%	% workforce	change%
16	348	-25%	0%	-0%	73%	5%	32%	1%	41%	18%
17	352	-21%	0%	-0%	45%	13%	62%	-6%	36%	17%
18	367	-15%	1%	-1%	33%	11%	71%	-6%	29%	10%
19	379	-10%	1%	-3%	23%	7%	78%	-5%	24%	5%
20	391	-5%	3%	-6%	20%	4%	81%	-3%	22%	3%
21	384	-3%	6%	-10%	16%	3%	84%	-2%	21%	2%
22	394	2%	10%	-15%	11%	2%	88%	-2%	19%	2%
23	397	4%	16%	-20%	6%	1%	92%	-1%	17%	2%
24	411	11%	23%	-22%	4%	0%	94%	-1%	16%	2%
Female										
16	330	-26%	0%	-0%	79%	5%	29%	4%	34%	10%
17	339	-23%	1%	-1%	53%	13%	54%	-4%	30%	11%
18	356	-16%	2%	-4%	37%	13%	64%	-6%	23%	6%
19	376	-8%	5%	-10%	23%	8%	70%	-5%	17%	2%
20	394	-2%	9%	-16%	18%	5%	71%	-2%	14%	1%
21	391	2%	15%	-21%	14%	4%	71%	1%	13%	0%
22	409	7%	23%	-24%	9%	3%	73%	3%	12%	0%
23	416	10%	30%	-26%	5%	2%	74%	7%	11%	0%
24	429	17%	38%	-26%	3%	1%	74%	10%	10%	-0%

Young and Married 1991 proportion of ward populations




Young Lone Parents 1991 proportion of ward populations




2.12: Marriages by Manner of Solemnization 1837–1991

number of weddings per year in England and Wales ('000s)

**2.13: Divorces by Partners' Previous Marital Conditions 1957–1991**

number of divorces in England and Wales ('000s)



Marriage


Marriage is one of the few indicators available (at a detailed geographical level) of religious and cultural attitudes, although it is also important for purely demographic reasons. It is included here because the propensity of people to marry influences the age structure as well as changing peoples' economic circumstances. Married people tend to live longer and have more children. A more detailed examination of the different forms families can take is reserved for a later chapter on society in general.

Marriage is currently in decline, particularly as solemnized through the established Church which, in 1991, conducted its lowest number of ceremonies ever recorded at just over one hundred thousand (despite a much larger population eligible to marry: OPCS 1990). Figure 2.12 shows how the absolute number of marriages has fluctuated over the last century and a half. The first peak was in 1919 and the second highest peak was in 1970. No doubt there would also be a peak at the end of the Second World War if figures for that period were available. Given the large numbers of 1960s baby boomers who are now young adults, it is even more remarkable that so few people are getting married in the 1990s. Marriages solemnized under religions which are not Christian are recorded as civil ceremonies. Jewish weddings are recorded separately, but the numbers are too small to be visible on a graph of this scale (the highest number of Jewish weddings ever recorded in England and Wales was just over 2000 in 1906). The increase in civil ceremonies since the 1960s will have been due mainly to the remarriage of divorcees and changes in social attitudes to religious ceremonies.


The cartogram opposite shows a marked urban–rural divide in the propensity of adults to be married. The group aged between 25 and 64 has been chosen to reduce the influence of different population structures in different areas. In a large number of London wards, and in pockets of other cities, over half the adults of these ages are single (however, these areas only contain 3% of the national population). The second map shows how it is the cities which have led the national decline in the proportion of the population marrying over the last two decades. The decline in the number of people who are married is partly due to fewer people marrying in the first place, but it is also due to an increasing number of divorces.

Divorce rates accelerated in 1972 following the implementation of the 1969 Divorce Reform Act (Coleman and Salt 1992: 196). They appear to have stabilised at around 150 000 per year, although this includes an increasing number of previous divorcees, with the absolute number of first marriage break ups falling slightly from 1981 to 1991. There are much more sophisticated methods of analysing divorce and marriage rates. Here, however, the basic patterns have been shown because it is these that need to be held in mind to form an overall picture of the population of Britain and the geographical differences between areas.


Married Residents 1991 proportion of ward populations



Married 1971-1991 change in ward populations



2.14: Marital and Residential Status by Age in Britain 1991



Pensioners


Progressing chronologically, the distribution of people of pensionable age has been reserved for the end of this half of the chapter. The maps opposite show the proportion of people of pensionable age or older (65 for men, 60 for women) in 1991, and how that proportion has changed since 1971. The coastal concentration is well established although particular areas of large cities also contain high concentrations of pensioners: the centre of Glasgow, for example. More surprising perhaps is the pattern of change. The elderly are no longer moving to the coasts in such large numbers, with well known resorts like Blackpool and Eastbourne seeing some of the greatest falls in the proportion of their populations who are elderly, as pensioners who die are not replaced. Instead it is to the outer suburbs and market towns that the elderly now appear to be migrating to in their greatest numbers. The elderly continue to leave the city centres.

Figure 2.14 provides a combined view of people's likely marital and residential status (from Figures 1.14 and 2.9). The pensionable years can be seen to provide the next most turbulent set of circumstances after young adulthood. Fewer pensioners are divorced because marriages made in the 1930s and 1940s have proved to be stable. More elderly women have been single all their lives than subsequent generations of women are likely to be; due partly to the two world wars. By the time women reach 75 (and when men reach 90) most have been widowed and have not remarried. The majority of elderly people living in institutions are widows.

The changing distribution of pensioners over time is important because they make up such a large and growing part of the population so that changes in their aspirations can have a marked overall effect. Figure 2.15 shows how, ironically, apart from London boroughs, the only category of districts to have seen a fall in their proportion of pensioners are labelled "resort ports and retirement districts". The sharpest rise in the proportion of pensioners has been in districts with new towns, reflecting the ageing of their previously young populations. The youngest group of pensioners shows this pattern most clearly. The proportion of the population aged 75 and over increased by exactly 50% from 1971 to 1991. It has grown most in the principal metropolitan districts and least in Inner London.



The cartogram of these changes shows that this is partly a result of how the boundaries are drawn. Around each major metropolis there is a ring of high rates of increases in proportions of the elderly. In the case of London that ring falls just outside the boundary, while in Merseyside, Tyne and Wear, Avon and the West Midlands it clearly falls just within the metropolitan area boundary. The advantage of showing distributions nationally, at the ward level, is that artifacts of administrative boundaries have less effect. A similar advantage is seen for spatially concentrated groups which are also only well represented at ward level, some of which are described next.

2.15: Proportion of Pensioners by Age and Type of District 1971, 1981, 1991




Pensioners 1991

proportion of ward populations




MAGENTA

2.16: Distribution of Ethnic Groups by Region and Metropolitan County 1991



BLACK

2.17: People Resident in Britain, Born in the New Commonwealth 1971–1991



Ethnic Minority Residents

Before 1991 people in Britain had, nationally, not been asked to which ethnic group they thought they belonged. Assumptions had been made on the basis of small surveys and on the birthplace of immigrants, but these were not thought to be particularly reliable because the groups being studied were so small. The idea that there are distinguishable ethnic groups is more contentious than the claim that it is useful to categorise people by their sex and age when looking at how society is constituted. It is unfortunate that the census office only used labels for groups associated with relatively recent waves of immigration. Nevertheless, the answers that people gave provide a wealth of information about these groups of people, if not about the ethnicity of the population as a whole.

A person is defined as a member of an *ethnic minority* if they ticked any box other than “white” on the census form. The map and cartogram opposite have been placed together so that the degree of concentration of ethnic minorities within only a few cities is made clear. Three distinct parts of London, and the centres of Birmingham, Leicester, Manchester and Bradford, contain most people belonging to ethnic minorities. Seventy seven percent of people in Britain live in wards where less than 5% of the population are in these groups. In this sense much of our society is only minimally “multi-racial”.



A nine-fold subdivision of ethnic groups is used in many of the diagrams which follow. Most labels should be self explanatory even though they are based on a mixture of skin colour, country of origin, religion and so on. The three which may not be clear are: “Black Other”, which includes people who wrote “Black British”, “Black/White” or similar; “Other Asian”, which includes people who filled in none of the specific black categories but wrote “Black Asian”, “East African”, or included a nationality elsewhere in Asia; and “Other Other” which includes “Arab”, “Asian/White” and numerous other possibilities. The census volumes should be consulted for more precise definitions (OPCS 1992).

The regional (and sub-regional) geography for each of these nine groupings of ethnic minorities is shown in Figure 2.16. Nationally, just over three million people ticked something other than white, 5.5% of the population. The cartogram shows that the spatial concentrations within regions are at least as distinct as those between them.

Figure 2.17 gives some indication of how these patterns arose over time but also highlights the inadequacies of using country of birth indicators as a proxy for ethnicity. For these maps Pakistan has been included with the New Commonwealth countries in 1981. The most distinctive features are the actual falls in the numbers born in the New Commonwealth countries living in rural districts in recent years. This is almost certainly not due to falls in ethnic minority populations, but to falls in the number of white people who were born in what were then the colonies, and who chose (and were able) to live in these rural areas. These people represent a white ex-colonial minority in decline.


Ethnic Minority Residents 1991

proportion of ward populations



MAGENTA

2.18: Residents born outside the UK by Year of Entry and Country of Birth 1989–1991



Source: Labour Force Survey 1990 and 1991

Black and Asian

Although members of all ethnic minorities are more likely to live in cities than whites, they are also likely to live in distinct parts of those cities. Two broad groupings have been used in the maps opposite. *Afro-Caribbean* consists of the three groups prefixed “Black-”, and *South-Asian* consists of people identifying with India, Pakistan or Bangladesh. Only in parts of London and in one ward in Manchester are more than a quarter of the population Afro-Caribbean, while in many wards in Wales, Scotland and the North practically nobody identifies with this category. The largest concentration of people of South-Asian ethnic origin now live in Birmingham, but many more smaller clusters of people with these backgrounds are visible even as far north as Dundee.

One reason for the very different spatial patterns is that many of these people's parents or grandparents entered Britain at different times. Figure 2.18 shows an estimate of when and from where people who migrated to this country and were living here in 1991 came. By 1977 most migration from the Caribbean had ceased, whereas migration from Bangladesh had only just begun. The sudden influx of East African Asians from Uganda in the 1970s is particularly distinctive. People migrating from the Irish Republic form the largest single group. By defining Irish-born as another ethnic group it is possible to subdivide the white majority slightly so this has been done, where possible, below.

Immigration and ethnicity are very strongly linked despite 47% of people in ethnic minorities having been born in the United Kingdom. Only 19% of their household heads were born here and so it can be assumed that the majority of those who are “British-born” are the children of people who migrated. Figure 2.19 gives, in detail, the breakdown of all individuals in each ethnic group both by country of birth and by the country of birth of household head (the person who put his/her name first on the census form). All the percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number and are not shown when that is zero. The figures for all individuals are shown in brackets when they are classified by the country of birth of the head of household. Thus, for instance, 1% of whites were born in the Irish Republic but 2% live in households in which the head of the household was born in the Irish Republic. Household head is not a very robust concept, but here it does help to show how strong the social links with various parts of the world may be for different groups, and how that is likely to alter according to their ages (household heads must be older than 16). For example, most of the almost half million people who see themselves as belonging to a “Black Caribbean” ethnic minority were born in Britain, 45% of them were born in the (New Commonwealth part of the) Caribbean, but 65% of them live in households whose head's country of birth was in the Caribbean. The other way in which this table can be used is to look across a region of the world to see which groups in Britain are most closely associated with these countries, East Africa, for example.


BLACK

2.19: % in Each Ethnic Group by People's Own and their Head of Household's Birthplace, 1991

Country of Birth (by household head in brackets)	white	Black Caribbean	Black African	Black Other	Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Chinese	Other Asian	Other Other
Total Persons in Britain ('000s)	51 086	493	202	176	835	474	161	152	191	285
England	80% (79%)	53% (32%)	35% (19%)	82% (52%)	41% (7%)	48% (6%)	36% (3%)	26% (10%)	22% (12%)	56% (39%)
Scotland	10% (10%)		1% (1%)	1% (2%)	1%	2%		2% (1%)	(1%)	2% (2%)
Wales	5% (5%)		1% (1%)	2% (2%)		1%	1%	1%		2% (2%)
Northern Ireland	(1%)									
Rest of United Kingdom										
Irish Republic	1% (2%)			1% (1%)						(1%)
Old Commonwealth										1% (1%)
Eastern Africa Commonwealth			8% (8%)	1% (1%)	17% (25%)	1% (2%)			6% (8%)	1% (3%)
Other Africa Commonwealth			38% (51%)	1% (4%)						1% (1%)
Caribbean Commonwealth		45% (65%)	1% (2%)	3% (23%)	1% (1%)			1% (1%)	1% (1%)	2% (6%)
Bangladesh							62% (94%)		1% (1%)	(1%)
India			(1%)	1% (1%)	37% (61%)	3% (7%)	(1%)	(1%)	3% (6%)	5% (8%)
Pakistan				(1%)	1% (1%)	45% (83%)	1% (1%)		2% (4%)	1% (3%)
South-East Asia Commonwealth					1% (1%)			46% (57%)	6% (5%)	2% (2%)
Cyprus				1% (1%)						
Other New Commonwealth				1% (2%)	1% (1%)			1% (2%)	22% (26%)	1% (3%)
Other European Community	1% (1%)			1% (1%)					(1%)	1% (1%)
Other Europe										
United States of America			1% (1%)	3% (3%)					(1%)	1% (1%)
China							12% (15%)			
Vietnam							6% (8%)		5% (6%)	
Rest of the World	(1%)	(1%)	14% (14%)	3% (3%)	1% (2%)		3% (3%)		32% (27%)	23% (25%)


Afro-Caribbean Residents 1991

proportion of ward populations



South-Asian Residents 1991



proportion of ward populations




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2.20: Age–Sex Distributions of Ethnic Groups in Britain 1991

The same scale is used on each graph which shows how the population of each ethnic group is distributed by age and sex.



BLACK



Ethnic Minority Groups

Each of the ethnic minority groups given in census output has a very distinct geographical pattern. These are shown here by local authority district because the numbers involved are often very small and because of the space which would otherwise be required. The key to each of the maps is the same so that the relative sizes of each ethnic group can be compared. Here people born in the Irish Republic are included as a surrogate ethnic group representative of those who would have classified themselves as Irish if this had been suggested. The areas of highest concentration are very different for different groups as should be evident opposite. The degrees of spatial variation in the places where practically nobody identifies with a particular group are also interesting. Very few areas contain nobody of Chinese origin, while there are unusually low numbers of people born in Ireland living in the Welsh Valleys or in Tyneside.


Coastal districts contain low numbers of all ethnic groups. One reason for this is the age distribution of people identifying with ethnic minorities which should be studied in conjunction with these maps. Figure 2.20 shows the age and sex population pyramids for each ethnic group including whites (which is close to that for the population as a whole). Only the Irish born tend to have an older structure, although that tapers quickly, possibly due to emigration in old age. The Irish born are also the only group to have significant numbers of people living among the population on the south coast.

All the non-white ethnic minorities have younger population structures than whites, explained largely by the periods when they or their parents migrated (Figure 2.18). Differences between the sex ratios are also apparent, there being more older Bangladeshi men than women in this country and fewer middle-aged “Other Asian” men than women. The “Black Other” and “Other Other” categories have the youngest age structures reflecting the increasing heterogeneity of ethnic identity in Britain. Ethnic categories are usually only defined when groups who think they are different mix, thus through the process by which ethnicity is defined there cannot be robust ways of classification.


One other reason why ethnic minority groups have been included here is that they are often used later on to show how, for instance, employment and housing are distributed unequally among people from these nine or ten backgrounds. When looking at those statistics it is important to bear in mind the different age structures of each of these groups. Young groups of people, for example, are more likely to be unemployed regardless of their ethnicity. It is possible, with census data, to standardise every statistic in a variety of ways; for instance, to show the standardised geographical distribution of people in ethnic minorities allowing for the prevailing age and sex structure of each group. While such statistics can enhance information it is most important to realise what the basic underlying patterns are before looking for more subtle variations. Here only those basic patterns are shown.

Ethnic Minority Groups 1991


proportions of district populations




Black Caribbean




Black African




Black Other




Indian




Pakistani




Bangladeshi




Chinese



Other Asian



Other Other



Irish born


• % of residents in ethnic minority

- up to 0.1%
- 0.1% to 0.5%
- 0.5% to 1.0%
- 1.0% to 5.0%
- 5.0% & above

Scale
= 1 000 000
people


MAGENTA

2.21: Change in % of Residents Born in England 1971–1991 by 1960s Immigration by Ward




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2.22: English Born Living in Scotland 1971–1991



2.23: English Born Living in Wales 1971–1991



Born in England

Birthplace was the traditional indicator of ethnic origin in British censuses before 1991. Knowing how many people living in one place were born in another gives an indication both of lifetime migration rates and of the national origins of different populations. Unfortunately, no geographical detail below the country level is recorded by the census, but even this information can produce some very striking distributions.


Just over three quarters of British residents were born in England; this is by far the largest group by birthplace and it has grown very slightly in proportion since 1971, as fewer people have entered the country from abroad. For obvious reasons most people living in Scotland and Wales were not born in England, although in a few wards on the Welsh border just over half of residents were born in England. Inside England itself, as the map opposite shows, it is people living in London who are least likely to have been born in England. The “English” are most prevalent in the north of England, concentrated at very high proportions in particularly distinct localities (see opposite).

The map of change shows how the pattern of 1991 is different from that of a generation ago. The two striking features are the decline in the proportion of Outer London's population who were born in England and the rise of English born people choosing to live in Scotland and Wales. These changes are only slight in comparison with the size of the English born population but they are very clearly clustered.


There will be many reasons to explain why this overall shift of people has occurred away from the capital and towards the periphery. The change is composed of both out-migration of the English and immigration from other countries (principally from Scotland and Wales) to London. Figure 2.21 plots the distribution of change against the proportion of people living in each ward in 1971 who were not born in Britain and who entered the country in the preceding ten years. Each ward in the graph is shaded identically to the shade used in the static distribution shown opposite. Although English born people are more likely to have left areas in the 1970s and 1980s where the rate of immigration was high in the 1960s, this is partly due to the absolute increase in those areas of the number of people who were born abroad. Their children, if born in these same wards, have an influence on the trend in the opposite direction.

The largest group of immigrants in Britain are the English in Scotland and Wales. Since 1971 in every county and region in these countries the proportion of people born in England has increased (see Figures 2.22 and 2.23). The number of English born people resident in these two countries has risen by 40% since 1971 to now stand at 893 000. This is the greatest increase of any group now living in a country other than that of its birth in Britain. In the more rural counties and regions of Wales and Scotland the rises have been even greater. English born people used to migrate more to live in the industrial areas of these two countries, now they migrate to their countryside.


Residents Born in England 1991 proportion of ward populations



Residents Born in England 1971–1991 change in ward populations



2.24: Change in the Proportion of Residents Born in Ireland by Region 1971–1991



Born in Ireland


Monitoring the number of people migrating to Britain from Ireland has been a major preoccupation of the British census for the last one hundred and fifty years (Craig 1987: 33). As Figure 2.20 shows, Irish born people are the only group, distinguished by the census authorities along with ethnic groups, to have a significantly older age profile than the population as a whole. Also the Irish born population in Britain is declining.

Nationally, only one in every 65 British residents was born in Ireland, with London and very distinct parts of the West Midlands and Manchester containing most of these, as the first map indicates. It is most probably the ageing of the Irish population which has led to the pattern of change shown since 1971. Irish born people have moved from the inner city to the outer city and have not been replaced by young Irish born migrants.

Figure 2.24 gives the broad regional changes. The same graphical format is used later to show the movements of the Welsh and Scottish born populations. Over the 1970s the South East saw the largest proportionate loss of its Irish born population closely followed by the West Midlands. For the former region that pattern was dramatically reversed in the 1980s so that by the end of the twenty year period three more people in every hundred living in London were born in Ireland than at the beginning. From the censuses it is not possible to say whether this was due to people moving from regions which lost large numbers of people born in Ireland or to immigration. The regions in the graph are shown ordered by the overall change from 1971 to 1991.


A further subdivision of the statistics for the Irish born population living in Britain is possible into those born in the Irish Republic and those born in Northern Ireland. The ratio of south to north nationally is 2.42:1 but this statistic disguises sharp differences even at the local authority district level, as Figure 2.25 shows. People born in the Irish Republic are more likely to be living in the south of Britain, while those born in Northern Ireland outnumber the Irish Republic born in most of the north of Britain. This difference is slowly decreasing as the second map in the figure shows — with the Northern Irish born increasing most rapidly in London while the strongest area of growth of the Irish Republic born living in Britain was around Glasgow, albeit both from low initial numbers. Later the geographical distributions of each group and their separate growth rates are shown (pages 55 and 57). Disentangling the effects of an ageing population from the influence of new young migrants and older Irish born emigrants is not easily possible as the age of the Irish population was not calculated in census statistics before 1991. There is evidence that the Irish born in Britain are a rapidly ageing population (King and Shuttleworth 1989), but because no question was asked about Irish ethnicity in the census we do not know how many younger people who were born in Britain identify with Ireland and how many born in Ireland do not see themselves as “Irish”.

2.25: Ratio of Irish Republic Born to Northern Irish Born 1991, 1971–1991




Residents Born in Ireland 1991

proportion of ward populations




Residents Born in Ireland 1971-1991

change in ward populations




MAGENTA

2.26: Change in the Proportion of Residents Born in Scotland by Region 1971–1991
change in % over the period shown



BLACK

2.27: Change in the Number of Residents Living in Scottish Regions 1901–1991
percentage change from 1901



Born in Scotland


As Scotland is the second largest country in Britain, people born in Scotland are the second largest group by birthplace, comprising just under 10% of the population. Out of every seven people born in Scotland, one is now living in England. The map opposite shows precisely where these lifetime migrants are likely to be. The proportions of Scottish born people in England are high near the border, particularly in Carlisle, Barrow in Furness and Blackpool. Further south, Scottish born people are most likely to be found in the west of London and across the Home Counties as well as in particular places such as Corby. The geographical patterns suggest that Scottish born migrants tend to end up in more affluent areas. The very low numbers of Scottish born people in most of the West Midlands, South Wales, Merseyside and South Yorkshire are also noticeable.

As the map of a generation of change shows, it is the older industrial areas to which Scottish born migrants are least likely to come to or to be replaced in. There is also a distinct ring in Outer London from which there has been a net reduction in the proportion born in Scotland, who now appear in greater numbers further afield. Most dramatic, however, are the changes which have taken place within Scotland itself. It is important to note that changes in the proportion of people born in Scotland can be produced by the movements and mortality of people born outside Scotland as well as by Scottish born people themselves; but at least one extra person in every hundred now living in the north, east and south of Scotland was not born in that country (as compared to twenty years ago). Only around Glasgow, but not in its centre, has the proportion of Scottish born people risen, and only then because there has been a greater proportionate decline in people born elsewhere living there.


Figure 2.26 shows just how dramatic the twenty year change has been for Scotland and how it has been sustained over the last two decades. The fact that it is the South West which has seen the highest rise in its Scottish born population suggests that it may be the retirement migration of people who left Scotland many years ago which is accounting for many of the patterns shown here. This figure allows the changes which occurred in the 1970s to be contrasted with those of the 1980s and also compared to the regional changes in the proportions of people born in Ireland (Figure 2.24). The explanation for the declining proportion of Scottish born people living in Scotland can be provided by looking at the rates of English born immigration shown in Figure 2.22.

Although here changes over the last twenty years are being highlighted, the changes over the last century have been much more dramatic. This is particularly the case in Scotland itself. Figure 2.27 shows the relative changes in population for each Scottish region and the island areas. Three of these areas still contain less people now than they did a century ago despite overall growth of the population nationally. The source of the data used in this figure is the same as that used in the maps shown on page 17.


Residents Born in Scotland 1991
proportion of ward populations



Residents Born in Scotland 1971–1991
change in ward populations



2.28: Change in the Proportion of Residents Born in Wales by Region 1971–1991




Born in Wales

One in twenty people living in Britain in 1991 was born in Wales, but only 80% of these people were living in Wales at that time. One simple reason why a higher proportion of the Welsh live in England than the Scots is that the Welsh border is much longer and Wales is smaller. The map shows the geographical diffusion of Welsh born people out from Wales into Avon, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and beyond. It also shows how Wales is very clearly split north and south; diffusion from the north being very much less evident than from the south. In terms of where people were born, it is the Valleys which have been becoming most “Welsh” over the last two decades. Their influence has led to the overall increase in the proportion of the total Welsh born population living in Wales shown in Figure 2.28. This has occurred despite the dramatic increases in the number of people born in England now living in Wales shown in Figure 2.23. Fewer Welsh born people are now leaving Wales than was the case twenty years ago.

Again the changes over the last ninety years have been more dramatic than those of recent decades as parts of Wales experienced rapid industrial expansion at the start of this century similar to the experience in parts of Scotland. In many ways, however, the Welsh experience of population change is now very different to that of Scotland. Figure 2.29 shows that the population of every Welsh County is now higher than it was a century ago despite significant rural depopulation. Powys has only just reached this state, however, but is now the fastest growing county. It is also the county which saw the highest proportionate increase in its English born population during the 1980s, followed by Dyfed, Gwynedd and Clwyd (Figure 2.23).


2.29: Change in the Number of Residents Living in Welsh Counties 1901–1991



One reason for the increasing proportion of Welsh born people living in Wales is the low out-migration rates of the Welsh which were reported in detail after the 1981 census (Brant 1984: 24, Devis 1983: 17, Kennett 1983: 223). Changes above or below 1% shifts in the proportion born in Wales are not that dramatic in areas where the majority of the population are born in Wales, whereas the falls of over 1% seen in parts of west London often represent a fall of more than half the Welsh born populations of those areas over twenty years. The Welsh born are, on average, becoming more concentrated in Wales and in the Valleys in particular. At the same time a new generation of people born in Wales whose parents came from England is now emerging. Figure 2.29 is testimony to the degree to which the influence of immigration is diluted over time. The populations of the areas which are now Gwent, Mid Glamorgan and West Glamorgan grew in population by an additional 50% from 1901 to 1921. It is somewhat ironic that at the start of this century largely English immigration fuelled the population growth of the Valleys which are now seen, in the simple demographic terms used here, as the most Welsh parts of Wales. Country of birth information can only be used as a poor proxy for “white” people's ethnic identities.


Residents Born in Wales 1991

proportion of ward populations



Residents Born in Wales 1971–1991

change in ward populations



2.30: Country of Birth of all Residents in Britain 1991

Countries of Birth	Population	prop- ortion	District with highest proportion	proportion	Countries of Birth	Population	prop- ortion	District with highest proportion	proportion
UNITED KINGDOM	51 114 048	93.12%	Blaenau Gwent	99.05%					
England	42 897 179	78.15%	Easington	97.83%					
Scotland	5 221 038	9.51%	Monklands	96.44%					
Wales	2 747 790	5.01%	Rhondda	93.83%					
Northern Ireland	244 914	0.45%	Corby	1.64%					
Rest of United Kingdom	3 127	0.01%	Epsom & Ewell	0.25%					
OUTSIDE UK	3 774 796	6.88%	Brent	42.14%					
Channel Islands	18 714	0.03%	Southampton	0.20%					
Isle of Man	9960	0.02%	Wirral	0.09%					
Irish Republic	592 020	1.08%	Brent	8.19%					
Ireland (part not stated)	530	0.00%	Brent	0.01%					
Old Commonwealth	177 355	0.32%	Kensington & Chelsea	3.17%					
Australia	73 217	0.13%	Kensington & Chelsea	1.63%					
Canada	63 153	0.12%	Kensington & Chelsea	0.71%					
New Zealand	40 985	0.07%	City of London	0.89%					
New Commonwealth	1 688 396	3.08%	Brent	23.89%					
Africa	331 313	0.60%	Brent	7.41%					
Eastern Africa	220 605	0.40%	Harrow	6.95%					
Kenya	112 422	0.20%	Harrow	3.89%					
Malawi	10 697	0.02%	Leicester	1.04%					
Tanzania	29 825	0.05%	Harrow	1.00%					
Uganda	50 903	0.09%	Harrow	1.76%					
Zambia	16 758	0.03%	Leicester	0.22%					
Southern Africa	23 253	0.04%	Kensington & Chelsea	0.18%					
Zimbabwe	21 252	0.04%	Kensington & Chelsea	0.17%					
Botswana, Lesotho & Swaziland	2001	0.00%	Isles of Scilly	0.10%					
West Africa	87 455	0.16%	Southwark	3.57%					
Gambia	1388	0.00%	City of London	0.05%					
Ghana	32 672	0.06%	Lambeth	1.09%					
Nigeria	47 085	0.09%	Southwark	2.44%					
Sierra Leone	6310	0.01%	Southwark	0.27%					
Caribbean	264 591	0.48%	Lambeth	5.87%					
Barbados	22 294	0.04%	Reading	0.62%					
Jamaica	142 483	0.26%	Lambeth	4.16%					
Trinidad and Tobago	17 620	0.03%	Haringey	0.33%					
Other Independent States	44 045	0.08%	Hackney	1.60%					
Caribbean Dependent Territories	6338	0.01%	Hackney	0.36%					
West Indies (so stated)	10 123	0.02%	Hackney	0.27%					
Belize	1210	0.00%	Argyll and Bute	0.02%					
Guyana	20 478	0.04%	Lambeth	0.49%					
Asia	937 937	1.71%	Tower Hamlets	16.19%					
South Asia	787 528	1.43%	Tower Hamlets	15.61%					
Bangladesh	105 012	0.19%	Tower Hamlets	14.63%					
India	409 022	0.75%	Leicester	7.70%					
Pakistan	234 107	0.43%	Bradford	4.69%					
Sri Lanka	39 387	0.07%	Brent	1.23%					
South East Asia	150 409	0.27%	Westminster, City of	1.59%					
Hong Kong	72 937	0.13%	Westminster, City of	0.60%					
Malaysia	43 511	0.08%	Westminster, City of	0.74%					
Singapore	33 961	0.06%	City of London	0.34%					
New Commonwealth Remainder	154 555	0.28%	Enfield	4.99%					
Cyprus	78 031	0.14%	Enfield	4.40%					
Gibraltar	11 391	0.02%	Gosport	0.21%					
Malta & Gozo	31 237	0.06%	Gosport	0.48%					
Mauritius	23 450	0.04%	Haringey	0.76%					
Seychelles	2967	0.01%	Hounslow	0.17%					
Other New Commonwealth	7479	0.01%	Westminster, City of	0.15%					
Europe including UK	52 403 308	95.47%	Blaenau Gwent	99.51%					
European Community+UK	52 200 488	95.10%	Blaenau Gwent	99.45%					
European Community-UK	493 890	0.90%	Kensington & Chelsea	9.06%					
Belgium	16 416	0.03%	Kensington & Chelsea	0.29%					
Denmark	14 226	0.03%	City of London	0.41%					
France	53 443	0.10%	Kensington & Chelsea	2.25%					
Germany	215 534	0.39%	Richmondshire	2.98%					
Greece	14 610	0.03%	Westminster, City of	0.53%					
Italy	91 010	0.17%	North Bedfordshire	1.87%					
Luxembourg	705	0.00%	Kensington & Chelsea	0.02%					
Netherlands	29 442	0.05%	Elmbridge	0.53%					
Portugal	19 775	0.04%	Kensington & Chelsea	1.03%					
Spain	38 729	0.07%	Kensington & Chelsea	1.67%					
Remainder of Europe (-EC)	174 146	0.32%	Kensington & Chelsea	2.98%					
Albania	161	0.00%	Kensington & Chelsea	0.01%					
Austria	20 645	0.04%	Camden	0.32%					
Bulgaria	1710	0.00%	Ross and Cromarty	0.48%					
Czechoslovakia	8720	0.02%	Camden	0.22%					
Finland	5285	0.01%	Kensington & Chelsea	0.14%					
Hungary	12 487	0.02%	City of London	0.24%					
Norway	8684	0.02%	City of London	0.31%					
Poland	73 738	0.13%	Ealing	1.32%					
Romania	3960	0.01%	City of London	0.19%					
Sweden	11 054	0.02%	Kensington & Chelsea	0.53%					
Switzerland	12 613	0.02%	Kensington & Chelsea	0.36%					
Yugoslavia	13 813	0.03%	Hammersmith & Fulham	0.39%					
Other Europe	1276	0.00%	Shetland	0.05%					
Turkey	26 597	0.05%	Hackney	2.64%					
(Former) U.S.S.R.	27 011	0.05%	Bradford	0.32%					
Africa	146 869	0.27%	Kensington & Chelsea	3.06%					
Algeria	3672	0.01%	Kensington & Chelsea	0.13%					
Egypt	22 849	0.04%	Kensington & Chelsea	0.59%					
Libya	6604	0.01%	Westminster, City of	0.09%					
Morocco	9073	0.02%	Kensington & Chelsea	0.70%					
Tunisia	2417	0.00%	Westminster, City of	0.06%					
Republic of South Africa	68 059	0.12%	Camden	0.92%					
Other Africa	34 195	0.06%	Haringey	1.15%					
America	185 033	0.34%	Forest Heath	18.64%					
United States of America	143 484	0.26%	Forest Heath	18.47%					
Caribbean	2504	0.00%	Forest Heath	0.07%					
Central America	4449	0.01%	Kensington & Chelsea	0.14%					
South America	34 596	0.06%	Kensington & Chelsea	1.26%					
Asia	231 045	0.42%	Westminster, City of	6.67%					
Middle East	101 719	0.19%	Westminster, City of	4.36%					
Iran	32 262	0.06%	Kensington & Chelsea	1.18%					
Israel	12 195	0.02%	Barnet	0.73%					
Other Middle East	57 262	0.10%	Westminster, City of	2.93%					
Remainder of Asia	129 326	0.24%	Kensington & Chelsea	2.69%					
Burma (Union of Myanmar)	10 608	0.02%	Croydon	0.15%					
People's Republic of China	23 784	0.04%	Cambridge	0.33%					
Japan	28 235	0.05%	Barnet	1.38%					
Philippines	21 836	0.04%	Kensington & Chelsea	1.09%					
Vietnam	20 119	0.04%	Southwark	0.82%					
Other Asia	24 744	0.05%	Hart	0.92%					
Remainder	3230	0.01%	Leicester	0.08%					

Born Abroad


Although the largest group of people living in Britain who were born abroad were from Ireland, the Irish born make up only 21% of all British residents who were not born in Britain. The complete breakdown (that is available for every ward in Britain) of the numbers of people born abroad is shown in Figure 2.30 by country. Countries are grouped first by whether they are members of the Commonwealth or not, then by continent and then region. The total number of people who claimed to be born in each country and are now resident in Britain is shown, followed by the percentage of all residents which that number represents, then the name of the local authority district which has the highest proportion from that country, and then that proportion. Local clusters can be surprising. For instance, the results of the return to Britain of the children of members of the armed forces born overseas may well be reflected through the unusual numbers of people born in Belize and Gibraltar who now live in Argyll & Bute and Gosport. Cambridge has the highest proportion of people born in China.

The geographical spread for ten of the largest and most distinctive countries or groupings of countries at the district level is shown opposite. These groupings were chosen so that comparisons could be made with figures taken from the 1971 census, shown later. The letters "CW" stand for "Commonwealth" and indicate that only countries that were members of the Commonwealth are included in the definition.


Most people live in wards where less than one in one hundred of the population were born in any of these distinct regions. The proportions that are shown here are very small, which is one reason for using this level of geographical aggregation. The geographical distributions of the Irish have already been mentioned; here Northern and Republic are shown separately. People born in the "Rest of Europe" (excluding Britain and Ireland) and the "Rest of the World" (excluding all the other groups shown) are the most numerous, comprising 670 000 and 810 000 people, respectively. They also have the most marked tendency to live in the south of England. The smallest group shown here is of those born in the South East Asian commonwealth comprising Hong Kong (49%), Malaysia (29%) and Singapore (22%) (see Figure 2.30). Geographically their distribution is similar to the next smallest group who were born in the "old commonwealth". The next two groups, which are similar, are those born in the Caribbean commonwealth and Pakistan or Bangladesh, as they both tend not to live near the coast. The pattern of Indian born settlement is most like that of people who were born in African Commonwealth countries (34% of whom were born in Kenya, most probably being "East African Asian" migrants, originally from India). Some of these maps can be compared with the district based distributions of ethnic minority groups shown earlier. Much of the difference in the patterns shown will be due to the number of people who were born in Britain but whose parents were born abroad.

Residents Born Abroad 1991


proportions of district populations




Northern Ireland




Irish Republic




Rest of Europe



Old Commonwealth




Rest of the World




African CW




Caribbean CW



India



Pakistan and Bangladesh




South East Asian CW

% of residents born abroad

- up to 0.1%
- 0.1% to 0.3%
- 0.3% to 0.5%
- 0.5% to 1.0%
- 1.0% & above


Scale
= 1 000 000
people




2.32: Residents Born in the UK by Age and Head of Household's Birthplace 1981–1991

HoH = head of household

% of 1991 residents born in the UK



% change 1981–1991 in residents born in the UK



Changing Countries


Because people were not asked their affiliations to ethnic groups at censuses before 1991, the change in the locations of people born outside Britain has often been used as a proxy for ethnic group changes, although, as Figure 2.17 suggested, this is unwise. Country of birth changes indicate more about the changing patterns of lifetime migration and the movements of an ageing group of immigrants to Britain, within Britain. Figure 2.31 shows how the proportions of people living in Britain who were born overseas have not changed dramatically over the last twenty years. Countries such as Bangladesh did not exist in 1971, and the European Community was not differentiated by the census then, so some care is needed when reading this figure. Here, for comparability, Northern Ireland includes all people born in other parts of the United Kingdom outside Britain. The pie charts increase slightly in size as the overseas born population has increased to include an additional 1% of the population between 1971 and 1991.

The geographical distribution of these changes for the ten groups used earlier is shown opposite. More people are living in districts which have seen a fall in the proportions of people born in the Irish Republic and the Caribbean Commonwealth than a rise. Places where there have been increases in the proportion of a district's population born in a particular country (or group of countries) often display very strong geographical proximity within Britain. A large proportion of many of these groups will, in 1991, have been students, which may account for some of the clusters. There have also been large differences in the ratios of men to women in some of these groups in earlier years. For instance, there were 2.58 men born in Pakistan to every woman born there living in Britain in 1971. That figure is now 0.95 to one, although this may be influenced by disparate rates of under-enumeration in the 1991 census.


The other use to which country of birth information can be put, in this context, is to estimate how many people living in Britain are the offspring of people who migrated to this country. A key assumption is that members of a household are related to the person stated on the census form to be the “head” of that household. Figure 2.32 shows the probability that a person was born in the United Kingdom given both his/her age and the country of birth of his/her household head. The figure also shows how that relationship has changed over the 1980s. The most striking change is that an extra one out of every five 25 year olds whose head of household was born in the New Commonwealth (including Pakistan) was born in the UK in 1991 as compared to 1981. By 1991 a majority (52%) of all those aged between 16 and 29 whose head of household was born in the New Commonwealth were themselves born in the UK. This change could well be the result of immigration controls which have made it more difficult for people born in the New Commonwealth to come to Britain in recent years. Their experiences contrast markedly with those of migrants from other countries outside Britain.

Residents Born Abroad 1971–1991


• change in district populations •



2.33: Migrants in Britain by Age and Administrative Area of Origin 1991



2.34: Migrants by Age and Sex in Britain 1971, 1981 and 1991



Migration

The first map opposite shows the cumulative effect of people migrating to Britain over the years, through depicting the proportion of each ward's population which was born abroad. This map shows the results of a pattern of life-time migration. The similarities with the distribution of students at their term time addresses are worth noting (see page 33). Only in a very few wards are less than 1% of the population born abroad.

The second map gives an indication of the turnover of the population by showing how many residents had a different address a year before census day. Thus this map shows the rate of annual migration. Again the similarities with concentrations of students are noteworthy, often coinciding with wards where more than one in six of the population moves every year. This contrasts strongly with large parts of Merseyside and Essex where less than one in sixteen people move per year.


Aspects of the movement of people both from outside and within Britain could consume many more pages of this atlas, but here there is only room for one. For migrants of all ages most moves are to new addresses within the same local authority district as is shown by Figure 2.33. Moves within the same ward are most likely when people are either young or very old, while moves from abroad occur with greatest frequency between the ages of 35 and 39 (7.7% of all moves for this age band are from abroad). It is important to know that the origin of migrants in this figure is taken as the place which they put as their usual address a year before census day, and a person is assumed to be a migrant if that address is different from their current usual address.

The rate at which people move depends not only on their age, family and educational circumstances, but also on general economic conditions (there are more migrants when there are more jobs). Thus, as Figure 2.34 shows, a higher proportion of the population moved home between 1970 and 1971 than between either 1980 and 1981 or 1990 and 1991. In all cases men are slightly more likely to move than women, although for any particular age group the rates are similar. Under 25, however, women are more likely to change address than men; over 25 it is men who are more likely to be moving. This difference may be associated with differences in the average age of marriage. A recent change that has occurred for both sexes is an increase in the proportion of people migrating in their 20s, recovering almost to 1971 levels.

Migration is often the most important influence on other demographic changes. The changes in the distributions of people by age are also due largely to changes in the destinations of migrants. Even patterns of fertility are altered by migration as new cohorts of potential parents move to slightly different areas, in different decades, to have children. Divorce and marriage both often cause moves to take place, as does retirement or becoming a student at a university. Migration can also have more subtle influences, for instance on the proportion of people speaking different languages in an area.


Residents Migrating to Britain by 1991

proportion of ward populations




Residents Migrating in Year to 1991


proportion of ward populations



2.35: Residents Who Speak Welsh in Wales by County 1981, 1991



2.36: Residents Who Can Speak Gaelic in Scotland by Region 1981, 1991



Language

Demography does not traditionally include the study of language, but as this is so closely related to birthplace, migration, age and ethnicity, that subject is included to end this chapter. Questions were asked about only two languages in the 1991 British census, Welsh and Scottish Gaelic, and these questions were only asked in Wales and Scotland, respectively. Hence only these two countries are used in the maps shown here using both equal area and equal population projections. Similar questions were asked in the 1981 census so the geographical distributions of the changes over time in the proportions of the population speaking these languages can also be shown here.


In Wales 508 000 people speak Welsh, while in Scotland only 66 000 people *can* speak Gaelic (the question is worded slightly differently as applied to the two countries). Figure 2.35 shows how dramatically the proportion who speak Welsh varies even at the county scale. The wards of most counties only fall into two shading bands as the map and cartogram opposite show. Most Welsh residents live in wards where less than one in ten people can speak Welsh.

On the equal land area map of Scotland the distribution of Gaelic speakers is shown most clearly although the cartogram and graph are reminders of how few people live in those areas. Ninety nine per cent of Scottish residents live in wards where less than 10% of the people can speak Scottish Gaelic. Figure 2.36 demonstrates how concentrated the Gaelic speakers are in Scotland. The Western Isles contains only 0.6% of the population of Scotland but 29.6% of all the Scottish people who can speak Gaelic.


In Wales the proportion of people who speak Welsh has fallen from 19.0% to 18.7% between 1981 and 1991. This is due largely to the age structure of people who speak Welsh, which is shown in Figure 2.37 (which includes a breakdown of the proportions who can read and write Welsh additionally). It is only the teaching of Welsh to children in schools which has averted a much steeper decline in the proportion of Welsh speakers. The map and cartogram of change show how this policy has resulted in actual rises in the proportion of people speaking Welsh living in areas where very few people used to be able to speak that language.

In Scotland, however, the age profile is even more marked, as Figure 2.38 makes clear. Although there is a slight rise between the ages of 11 and 15 this will be no compensation in the coming years for the relatively high proportions of very elderly people who can speak Gaelic. In 1981 1.64% of people in Scotland aged over 3 could speak Scottish Gaelic; now that figure is 1.37%. The decline has been most marked in those areas where the highest proportions of people can speak Gaelic. Elsewhere there is no appreciable level from which to decline except just to the north of Glasgow city centre, where a small but noticeable proportion used to claim to be able to speak Scottish Gaelic in 1981.

2.37: Welsh Speakers by Age and Sex 1991




2.38: Gaelic Speakers by Age and Sex 1991






Residents Speaking Gaelic or Welsh 1991

proportion of ward populations



Residents Speaking Gaelic or Welsh 1981–1991

change in ward populations



Conclusion: People in Britain

Who We Are

Demographic statistics concern some of the most basic facts about people: how old they are, how many children they have, their sex, marital status, birthplace, movement and so on. In Britain some of this information is seen as so important that it has been centrally collected since 1837, with many local records dating back to the Reformation of the 1530s. There has long been official concern over the growth, make-up and movement of the population, which has been particularly active regarding immigration and ethnic identity. However, only at the most recent census were all people in this country explicitly asked to state what they felt their ethnic group to be; before then it had been inferred from their birthplace. Who the people of Britain are, where they come from, whether they choose to marry, what languages they speak and how many children they have is of interest to social researchers as well as to government. For geographical studies it is necessary to know who makes up the population in each area in order to understand the effects of many changes which occur in particular localities and so impact disproportionately upon different groups of people. For example, to know if children are likely to grow up in areas of high unemployment, the distributions of both children and of adults out of work have to be mapped. Mapping demography shows how the chances and decisions of different groups in society are spatially constrained. To talk of the opportunities and problems faced by young adults growing up in Bangladeshi families is not possible without an appreciation of the places where most of those families live.

Mapping Minorities: Colour Print C

If a cartogram were drawn of the dominant ethnic group in each ward in Britain then 99.6% of the page would be coloured to represent white (on an equal area map over 99.9% of the page would be white). An interesting distribution is shown when the second largest group of residents is used to colour the cartogram — the largest minority. The same cartogram can also indicate differences within the mostly white category if country of birth divisions are also included. This has been done to paint the distributions of largest minorities shown in Colour Print C. Each ward is shaded one of fifteen colours depending on which national or ethnic group minority is largest within it. Thus, if a ward contained one hundred people, ninety of whom were white, seven were Indian, two Pakistani, one “Other Other” (see page 40), and eighty were born in England, ten in Scotland, one each in Wales, Ireland and somewhere else within the European Community, and seven elsewhere in the world, then that ward would be shaded to show that the largest minority were Scottish born. The ten Scottish born residents in the ward being a larger minority than the eight residents identifying with the Indian ethnic group;

the ethnic group and birthplace majorities being white and English born, respectively. This may appear to be a very arbitrary statistic, in that the presence of a single person can determine a ward's category, but it produces a simple pattern, as Colour Print C shows. However, it should be noted that amalgamating two groups will increase their overall representation dramatically (if they overlap at all spatially), while dividing a group could markedly reduce its total representation.

Just over a third of all wards are coloured blue, showing that in these places the largest minority is Scottish born. Scotland itself is not coloured blue because the Scottish born themselves are in the majority there. The second largest classification of wards are those where the largest minority was born in Ireland (mostly in Eire). Of the remaining 50% of wards, over half have English or Welsh born residents as their largest minority. The border between England and Wales is clearly shown by the group which is in the minority on each side. A further 3% of wards have people born in other European countries as the largest minority by this classification, most of these being in or around the capital. Less than a fifth of the population of Britain live in wards where the largest minority is from an ethnic rather than from a national group, and in half of these the largest minority are Indian as this is the most widely spread group to have been given a category. This group can also be seen to be spread out further from urban areas than most other ethnic minority groups. The next largest group of wards to be classified have Black Caribbean residents as their largest minority, mainly in north and south London. They are followed by the populations in wards in which the Pakistani ethnic minority is largest, mostly in West Yorkshire cities. All other ethnic groups are the largest minorities in areas containing less than 1% of the population. Black African and Bangladeshi residents are located mostly in central London. The clearest cluster of wards typified by Black Other residents are near American airforce bases in East Anglia. The wards shaded to show Chinese minorities are few and far between, while the Other Asian groups, which cover a similarly sized population, are clustered in south west London, and the smallest group of seven wards is typified by the “Other Other” miscellaneous minorities.

Age and Sex

Traditionally British censuses asked demographic questions partly to ensure that enough men of “fighting age” were being produced, just as questions on place of birth were asked to monitor the influx of predominantly Irish labour. More recent justifications for these questions are that appropriate educational, health and housing services should be provided in each part of the country but, under the veneer of social provision, issues of morality and nationalism still affect what is asked and shown in official statistics. This atlas reflects these debates. For instance, in 1991 the number of babies born to married mothers was at its lowest level in at least 150 years. The reciprocal increase has been in

births registered by unmarried couples rather than by lone mothers. The combination of high numbers of young women and low rates of marriage in London mean that over a third of all children in most wards in the capital do not live with two married parents (see page 175). This is partly because children growing up in London and in other large cities tend to be young and will often have young parents who may have decided to delay marriage until they leave those cities (see page 31). The parts of these cities in which most young children are brought up also contain the most local authority housing (page 119) and so it is not surprising that many lone parent households are in this tenure. It is difficult to study these social changes in perspective without understanding the geographical changes that have occurred in patterns of marriage, child rearing, family structure and housing tenure, as well as appreciating the processes by which adults choose to have children, and by which housing is distributed. Similarly, an understanding of changes in the social structure of many inner city areas (see page 191), requires an understanding of dramatic demographic changes such as the influx of young adults into these areas caused by the growth of higher education (page 33). This in turn will affect family structures which are closely related to age (Figure 6.1).

Migration and Projection

Population movement through migration is the simplistic cause of most social change in Britain. When an area as small as a ward is compared over decades it is usually the characteristics of different groups of people which are being contrasted, due to the effects of in- and out-migration. The most dramatic localized changes to the social geography of Britain have been a result of people moving between countries. As English migrants settle in increasing numbers in the more rural regions and counties of Scotland and Wales they change the complexion of these places in many ways (see, for example, page 183 which shows the spread of graduates into these countries). Similarly, the destinations of migrants from the most recent periods of overseas immigration can be seen reflected in the family structure of changed communities (page 177). The changing preferences of pensioners, who no longer move in great numbers to the coast, alters the map of dependency in Britain (page 209). The maps in this atlas show the results of migration, rather than migration flows themselves, which are more difficult to draw (see Dorling 1995), and so it is necessary to remember that there is a great deal of population movement which “cancels itself out” in terms of social change (page 59). Although migration is the most important demographic influence on other social changes, other factors are also vital. The ageing of the population in-situ affects many patterns shown in the chapters which follow; the pattern of ill-health in particular (page 137). Concern with the changing demographic structure of Britain is also a major reason for monitoring population change.

In 1991 one person in 27 in Britain was aged 80 or over. By 2031 this proportion will have almost doubled to one person in 15. Simultaneously, the proportion of people aged under 40 is projected to fall from 56% to 47% (OPCS 1995). Thus demographic change will change many other aspects of society. In the short term, projections have been made at the level of standard regions and metropolitan counties in England which show just how unevenly distributed these demographic changes could be (Population Trends 1994). In the Northern region, the West Midlands region and in Merseyside county an additional 1% of the population will be aged 75 and over by 2011. This represents relative rises in the size of that group of over 18%, 17% and 20%, respectively. Over the same period the number of people aged 75 and over is projected to fall by 11% in Greater London and to increase its share of the population by only 0.1% in the South East as a whole. The South West will continue to have the highest regional share of this group, rising from one resident in twelve to one in eleven being aged 75 years or older in only a few years time.

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